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ABSTRACT
We investigate the role of transferability of adversarial attacks in
the observed vulnerabilities of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). We
demonstrate that introducing randomness to the DNN models is
sufficient to defeat adversarial attacks, given that the adversary
does not have an unlimited attack budget. Instead of making one
specific DNN model robust to perfect knowledge attacks (a.k.a,
white box attacks), creating randomness within an army of DNNs
completely eliminates the possibility of perfect knowledge acquisi-
tion, resulting in a significantly more robust DNN ensemble against
the strongest form of attacks. We also show that when the adver-
sary has an unlimited budget of data perturbation, all defensive
techniques would eventually break down as the budget increases.
Therefore, it is important to understand the game saddle point
where the adversary would not further pursue this endeavor.
Furthermore, we explore the relationship between attack sever-
ity and decision boundary robustness in the version space. We
empirically demonstrate that by simply adding a small Gaussian
random noise to the learned weights, a DNN model can increase
its resilience to adversarial attacks by as much as 74.2%. More im-
portantly, we show that by randomly activating/revealing a model
from a pool of pre-trained DNNs at each query request, we can put
a tremendous strain on the adversary’s attack strategies. We com-
pare our randomization techniques to the Ensemble Adversarial
Training technique and show that our randomization techniques
are superior under different attack budget constraints.
KEYWORDS
adversarial attacks; adversarial machine learning; deep neural net-
works
1 INTRODUCTION
Vulnerabilities of machine learning algorithms have been brought
to attention of researchers since the early days of machine learning
research [2, 7, 24]. Adversarial machine learning as a general topic
has been extensively studied in the past, covering a wide variety of
machine learning algorithms [3, 6, 13, 14, 17, 23, 29, 45]. However, it
is the recent popularity of Deep Neural Network (DNN) that has put
the adversarial learning problem under the spotlight across a large
number of application domains, especially in image classification
and cybersecurity. The ease of breaking down DNNs by perturbing
as little as a few pixels in an image raised great concerns on the
reliability of DNNs, especially in application domains where active
adversaries naturally exist. The seemingly extreme vulnerability
of DNNs has sparked booming academic development in robust
DNN research. Two major directions dominate the current effort in
searching for a robust remedy, both addressing the sensitive nature
of DNNs. One is to manipulate the source input such that the hidden
“absurdity” in its adversarial counterpart would disappear after the
preprocessing [20]; the other is to directly address the root cause
of the sensitivity of DNNs [31]. So far none has proved to be the
consistent winner.
Perhaps, the most disturbing thought about adversarial attacks
is the contagion effect of the crafted adversarial samples, formally
described as transferability [39]. It has been shown that adversarial
samples that defeat one DNN model can easily defeat other DNN
models. Furthermore, adversarial samples computed from a DNN
model may successfully defeat other types of differentiable and
non-differentiable learning techniques including support vector
machines, decision trees, logistic regression, and even the ensem-
ble of these algorithms [32]. The idea of transferability has been
widely, and undoubtedly, accepted as a common phenomenon, lead-
ing research efforts away from further investigating the nature
of transferability. In fact, the success story of black-box attacks is
strictly based on the assumption of transferability [9]. To attack
a black-box learning model, of which the internal training data
and learned parameters are kept secret from the attackers, a surro-
gate learning model is built by probing the black-box model with
unlabeled samples. Once the label information is obtained for the
unlabeled samples, the surrogate learningmodel will be trained, and
adversarial samples against the surrogate model can be computed
thereafter. Based on the idea of transferability, these adversarial
samples are believed to be able to defeat the black-box model as
well.
In this paper, we argue that transferability should not be au-
tomatically assumed. Instead, it has a strong dependence on the
depth of invasion that the adversarial samples are allowed in the
input space. We show that by simply adding small random noises
to the learned weights of a DNN model, we can significantly im-
prove the classification accuracy by as much as 74.2%, on condition
that the adversary’s goal is to misclassify a sample with minimum
perturbation cost. On the other hand, if the adversary can mod-
ify samples without cost constraints, that is, they can arbitrarily
modify samples until they are misclassified without penalty, no
robust learning algorithm would exist to defeat this type of attack.
Therefore, transferability is essentially the observable trait of the
severity of adversarial data perturbation. In addition, we show that
by randomly selecting a DNN model from a pool of DNNs at each
query request, including probing request and classification request,
we can effectively mitigate transferability based adversarial attacks.
Furthermore, we show that the ensemble of a set of DNN models
can achieve nearly perfect defense against adversarial attacks when
the attack budget is low. Even when the attack budget is high, the
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ensemble is significantly more robust than the Ensemble Adversarial
Training technique [40].
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We investigate transferability of adversarial samples in
terms of decision boundary-robustness and the intensity
of adversarial attacks.
• We demonstrate that transferability should not be auto-
matically assumed for a learning task, and by holding on
to a subset F of DNN models, we can defeat the adversary
who has the perfect knowledge of a DNN model built with
the same training data as F , but with different initializa-
tion points for stochastic gradient descent. Furthermore,
we demonstrate that the ensemble of F can provide the
strongest defense against severe attacks.
• We demonstrate that by adding a small Gaussian random
noise to the weights of a pre-trained DNN, we can signifi-
cantly increase the robustness of the DNN model.
• We compare our techniques to the existing ensemble ad-
versarial training technique and show that our proposed
randomization approaches are more robust against the
state-of-the-art attacks.
2 RELATEDWORK
Szegedy et al. [39] showed that adversarial samples computed from
one DNNmodel can effectively defeat the same DNNmodel, achiev-
ing 100% attack success rate or 0% accuracy on the adversarial sam-
ples. In addition, the adversarial samples computed from one DNN
model are general enough to defeat other DNNmodels trained with
different architectures, or with different training samples. Paper-
not et al. [33] presented a black-box attack strategy that involves
training a local model on inputs synthetically generated by an ad-
versary and labeled by a black-box DNN. They compute adversarial
examples from the local substitute model, and successfully defeat
the black-box DNN. Although they achieved very impressive attack
success rates, their targets (the black-box DNNs) are online deep
learningAPI that remain static (no learningweights variations) after
been trained. They also presented evidence of transferability of ad-
versarial samples across several DNN models trained with different
layer parameters. Liu et al. [28] presented a study on transferability
of both targeted and untargeted adversarial examples, where tar-
geted adversarial samples are computed to be misclassified into the
classes the adversary desires, while untargeted adversarial samples
do not have desired labels specified. Tremèr et al. [40] discovered
that if two models share a significant fraction of their subspaces,
they enable transferability. They showed that adversarial samples
computed from linear models can transfer to higher order models.
They also presented a counter example where transferability be-
tween linear and quadratic models failed. Goodfellow et al. [18, 33]
showed that explicit defenses such as distillation [34] and adversar-
ial training [18] are not effective on eliminating transferability of
adversarial samples.
Defensive strategies are quickly developed in response to the
observed vulnerabilities of DNN models. A typical approach is
to enhance a DNN model by re-training on its own adversarial
samples [18]. The problem with this type of approach is that it
may overfit to the set of adversarial samples in the training set. In
addition, once the adversary knows the defense strategy, it may
compute a new set of adversarial samples, optimized against the
newly trained DNN model. Other defense techniques [4, 35, 44],
including fine-tuning, distillation, and stability training, are not
always effective against adversarial samples [9]. Chalupka et al. [11]
presented a learning procedure for training a manipulator function
that is robust against adversarial examples. However, the technique
cannot obtain state-of-the-art accuracy on the non-attacked test
sets [4]. More recently, several new defenses were proposed [8,
15, 20, 30, 31, 36, 37, 43]. However, all except one failed the latest
attacks [1]. The most promising one was presented by Madry et
al. [31]. They presented a minimax style solution to L∞ attacks
under the traditional robust optimization framework [38, 41, 42].
The innermaximization finds the attacks thatmaximize the loss, and
the outer minimization finds the learning parameters that minimize
the expected loss. Although the problem can be approximately
solved, it is difficult to perform its adversarial retraining on large
scale image datasets. In addition, its robustness to attacks with
other distance metrics is limited.
Besides defense techniques, many detection techniques were pro-
posed to differentiate adversarial samples from benign ones. Carlini
and Wagner [9] specifically studied ten detection schemes, includ-
ing principle component detection [5, 21, 27], distributional detec-
tion [16, 19], and normalization detection [16, 19, 27]. Among all
the detection techniques, only randomization with dropout showed
promising results.
3 ROBUST LEARNINGWITH
RANDOMIZATION
We consider the adversarial learning problem where adversarial
data perturbation is bounded by ϵ ≥ 0. If the attack is unbounded,
the adversary could simply change every feature in a sample and
make it identical to the target samples. There does not exist a
successful defense for this type of attack. A more surreptitious
attack scenario is where perturbations are sufficiently small such
that humans can make the right classification, but strong enough
to foil a trained DNN model.
3.1 Transferability v.s. Attack Intensity
Given a DNN model f trained on the training set T , let x∗ ∈ D
be a boundary data point of f , that is, x∗ sits right on the decision
boundary of f and the decision for x∗ is undefined. We define the
robustness of the DNN model f at x∗ as the maximum perturbation
ρ(f ,x∗) to x∗ such that for every x ∈ T , f (x + ρ(f ,x∗)) = f (x). In
other words, ρ(f ,x∗) is the minimum perturbation any data point
in the training set has to have in order to reach x∗ on the decision
boundary. Therefore, the robustness of the DNN model f can be
defined, in terms of points on the decision boundary, as:
µ(f ) = Ex∗ {ρ(f ,x∗)| f (x∗) = ∅},
where f (x∗) = ∅ indicates the decision for x∗ is undefined on the
boundary. Higher µ(f ) values suggest greater expected minimum
distance to travel in order to step across the decision boundary, and
thus more robust f against adversarial data perturbation. We refer
to µ(f ) as boundary robustness.
2
The transferability of an adversarial perturbation to a data point
x ∈ D depends on the attack intensity, that is, the expected mini-
mum perturbation µ(f , ϵ), bounded by ϵ , to defeat the DNN model
f . Attack intensity can be defined by considering point-wise ro-
bustness [4]:
ρ(f ,x) = inf{ϵ}
s .t . | |x ′ − x | |p ≤ ϵ, f (x ′) , f (x)
that is, given an instance x ∈ D, ρ(f ,x) is the minimum upper
bound of the perturbation for which a DNNmodel f fails to classify
correctly. | | · | |p is the Lp norm, and ϵ ≥ 0 specifies the upper bound
of the attack intensity:
µ(f , ϵ) = Ex ∈D {ρ(f ,x)|ρ(f ,x) ≤ ϵ},
which is the expected bounded perturbation for which f is sus-
ceptible to adversarial attacks. If boundary robustness µ(f ) is more
likely to be weaker than the attack intensity µ(f , ϵ), we consider
the attack against f is generally transferable; otherwise, the attack
is not transferable:
tr (f ,x ′) =
{
1 if P[µ(f ) > µ(f , ϵ)] < δ
0 Otherwise
where 0 < δ < 12 , tr is the transferability. Exhaustively searching
the sample space to determine the expected minimum distance to
the nearest adversarial sample is computational intractable. Instead,
we can investigate the spread of the DNN model distribution in
the version space. The greater the difference between the decision
boundaries of a pair of DNN models in the version space, the more
difficult for the adversary to defeat both models with a single adver-
sarial perturbation, that is, a transferable perturbation. In the next
section, we discuss how to measure the spread of the DNN model
distribution in the version space, and present two randomization
scheme to enhance the existing DNN models.
3.2 Robust DNN Learning
Let F = { fi |i ∈(0,∞)} be a set of DNN models trained with stochas-
tic gradient descent (SGD) from random initialization points. We
assume the weight of the DNNmodel f ∈ F is a multivariate contin-
uous random variableW , with a probability density function ϕ(w),
mean µ, and covariance matrix Σ. A trained DNN model should
satisfy:
Pw∼N(µ,Σ)(f (x) = y) > 1 − γ
for a given sample x with a true label y and γ ∈ ( 12 , 1).
We are interested in finding out whether a DNN model fi is
robust against adversarial samples X jadv computed from fj where
i , j. If the decision boundaries of fi and fj are quite different
from each other, the adversary would inevitably have a much more
difficult time defeating fi withX jadv without knowing fi exactly. To
estimate the difference of the decision boundaries among the DNN
models in F , we measure the spread of the weightW—a vector of n
continuous random variables with mean µ and covariance matrix
Σ.
We compute the differential entropy h(W ) to measure the spread
ofW with a pdf ϕ(w):
h(W ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ϕ(w) logϕ(w)dw
According to the maximum entropy theorem [12],
h(W ) ≤ 12 log[(2πe)
n |Σ|]
with equality if and only ifW ∼ N(µ, Σ). A high differential entropy
value implies high spread ofW , and therefore the decision bound-
aries of any pair of models are largely different in the version space.
As a result, attacks on one DNN model may not easily transfer to
defeat other DNN models in the version space.
In an adversarial learning task, to make the learning model ro-
bust, two conditions must be satisfied: 1.) using different decision
boundaries for two different types of queries: prediction and attack
probing; and 2.) the expected distance between two decision bound-
aries is sufficiently large. More specifically, we need a run-time
setup such that the adversary may have a perfect knowledge of one
of our DNN models fa ∈ F for computing adversarial samples, but
the DNN model fp used for prediction is highly likely to be differ-
ent from fa . In addition, the more spread out the random weight
vectors drawn from ϕ(w) for fa and fp are, the more robust fp will
be against adversarial samples Xaadv computed from fa . We discuss
two randomization schemes for robust DNN learning below.
3.2.1 Random Selection of DNNs for Different Queries. We train
a set of DNNs F = { fi |i ∈[1,M ]}. At each query request, a DNN
model fi ∈ F is randomly selected. If it is a query Qa from an
adversary, the DNNmodel is returned for the adversary to compute
adversarial samples; if the query Qp is from a user for predicting
for sample x , the prediction made by fi ∈ F for x is returned. The
process is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Random selection of DNNs fi and fj from F for
different query types.
The attack is partially white-box attack since the adversary has the
perfect knowledge of one DNN model in the set. If the total number
of pre-trained DNNsM > 1ξ for 0 < ξ < 1, the probability P(fa =
fp | fa , fp ∈ F ) < ξ . Therefore, the more DNN models we train, the
less likely that fa is the same as fp . If the spread ofW is sufficiently
large, fp would be robust to attacks computed from fa .
The robustness of this randomization scheme depends onwhether
we can keep a subset of the pre-trained DNNs secrete, and whether
the decision boundaries of the pre-trained DNN models are largely
different. In the case where there is a collision between fa and fp ,
we can make more robust predictions with the ensemble of the
entire set, or the subset, of the pre-trained DNNs.
3.2.2 Randomizing a DNN with Random Weight Noise. In prac-
tice, training a large number of DNN models may not be feasible
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because of the sheer size of the problem. In our second randomiza-
tion scheme, we simply introduce randomization to a DNN model
by adding a small random noise to the weight of a pre-trained DNN,
as shown in Figure 2. For the simplicity of exposition, we consider
a two layer neural network:
f (x) = argmax
ℓ
w ′′д(w ′ · x),
whereд is the activation function,w ′ ∼ N(µ ′, Σ′),w ′′ ∼ N(µ ′′, Σ′′)
are multivariate random weight vectors, with means µ ′ and µ ′′,
covariance matrices Σ′ and Σ′′. We add a Gaussian random noise
to the weight vectorsw ′ andw ′′:
w ′ = w ′ + ∆w ′
w ′′ = w ′′ + ∆w ′′
where ∆w ′ ∼ N(µ ′,νδ ′) and ∆w ′′ ∼ N(µ ′′,νδ ′′), δ ′ and δ ′′ are
the variances of w ′ and w ′′, respectively. 0 < ν < 1 is a small
constant used to compute the variances of the Gaussian random
noise added to the weight vectors.
Figure 2: Adding random noise to a DNN model f to create
a new model f ′ for making predictions.
This randomization scheme works if 1.) adding a small random
noise to the weight does not affect the predictive accuracy on the
original non-corrupted samples; and 2.) the new model is not only
accurate but more resilient to attacks against the original model.
The clear advantage of this technique is computational efficiency.
We only need to train one model, and then add random noise to
the model to transform it to a more robust model. Note that we
can create a new DNN model by adding small random noise to the
pre-trained one at each query request for prediction, with negligible
cost.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We experiment on three datasets: MNIST, CIFAR-10, and German
Traffic Sign [22, 25, 26]. The MNIST dataset has 60,000 training
instances and 10,000 test instances. Each instance is a 28x28 image.
There are ten digit classes for the classification task. The CIFAR-10
dataset has 60,000 images in 10 classes. There are 6000 images in
each class. Each instance is a 32x32 color image. There are 50,000
images for training and 10,000 for testing. The German Traffic Sign
dataset has 51,839 images in a total of 43 classes. Image sizes vary
between 15x15 to 250x250 pixels. Each image is resized to 32x32. We
used 39,209 for training, and 12,630 images for testing. We compare
our randomness techniques to the Ensemble Adversarial Training
technique [40].
The architecture of the DNN model for CIFAR-10 includes two
convolution layers with 64 filters, two convolution layers with
128 filters, two fully connected layers, and one output layer. For
MNIST, the DNN model consists of two convolution layers with 32
filters, two convolution layers with 64 filters, two fully connected
layers, and one output layer. For the Traffic Sign dataset, the model
includes two convolution layers with 64 filters, two convolution
layers with 128 filters, two fully connected layers and one output
layer. Details about layer component are given in Table 1.
As a reminder, we introduce randomness in two different ways:
1.) by randomly selecting a model from a large pool of DNNs at
each query request, either for probing or for prediction; and 2.) by
randomly adding a small noise to the weights of a trained DNN at
each request. In both cases, we investigate the predictive accuracy
of a single randomDNN, and the predictive accuracy of an ensemble
of 10, 20, and 50 random models, respectively. We add Gaussian
random noise to the learned weights with zero mean and 0.01
standard deviation. We train the pool of DNNs using stochastic
gradient descent from random initialization points.
We directly apply Carlini and Wagner’s latest L2 and L∞ at-
tacks [9, 31] in our experiments. We tested both targeted and un-
targeted attacks by specifying whether the adversary has a desired
label to target. Depending on how closeness is measured, two dif-
ferent types of attacks are performed: L2 attack (measuring the
standard Euclidean distance) and L∞ attack (measuring the maxi-
mum absolute change to any pixel). We randomly select 1000 sam-
ples from the test set, compute their adversarial samples, and test
various DNN models on the adversarial samples. We repeat each
experiment 10 times, and report the averaged results. For Ensemble
Adversarial Training [40], we generate 10,000 adversarial samples
computed from different DNNs, and add the 10,000 adversarial sam-
ples with the true labels to the training set to train a new DNN
model.
4.1 L2 Targeted Attacks
In this set of experiments, we investigate the transferability of
adversarial samples generated using the L2 attack model when the
attack is targeted. We use Carlini and Wagner’s iterative L2 attack
algorithm, which is superior to other existing attacks, to generate
the adversarial samples [10]:
x∗ = argmin
x ′∈D
| |x ′ − x | |22 + c · l(x ′),
where l(x ′) = max(max{Z (x ′)i : i , t} − Z (x ′)t ,−k), Z represents
the logits of a DNN model f , and k controls the confidence of
attack: when the confidence is zero, the attack just succeeds; when
the confidence k is higher, the adversarial sample is more likely
to be misclassified as the target. We increase the attack budget by
setting the confidence value increasingly larger to simulate the
attack intensity. The higher the confidence is, the more severe
the attacks are. Figure 3 demonstrates how the confidence value
affects the quality of the images after the attacks. The attack is
already noticeable when the confidence value is zero, that is, when
the attacker fools the DNN with minimum data perturbation. As
the confidence value increases, the quality of the images drops
significantly after the attacks.
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Table 1: The architecture of the DNN models for CIFAR-10, MNIST, and German Traffic Sign datasets.
Dataset Layer Component
CIFAR-10
1. two 2D convolution layers: 64 filters, stride 3; 2D Max Pooling: kernel size 2; ReLU activation
2. two 2D convolution layers: 128 filters, stride 3; 2D Max Pooling: kernel size 2; ReLU activation
3. two fully connected layers: 256 output; ReLU activation
4. one output layer: 10 output
MNIST
1. two 2D convolution layers: 32 filters, stride 3; 2D Max Pooling: kernel size 2; ReLU activation
2. two 2D convolution layers: 64 filters, stride 3; 2D Max Pooling: kernel size 2; ReLU activation
3. two fully connected layers: 200 output; ReLU activation
4. one output layer: 10 output
Traffic Sign
1. two 2D convolution layers: 64 filters, stride 3; 2D Max Pooling: kernel size 2; ReLU activation
2. two 2D convolution layers: 128 filters, stride 3; 2D Max Pooling: kernel size 2; ReLU activation
3. two fully connected layers: 256 output; ReLU activation
4. one output layer: 43 output
Confidence = 0 Confidence = 5
Confidence = 10 Confidence = 20
Figure 3: Quality of images after adversarial attacks with
different confidence values.
Figure 4 shows the detailed results on the three datasets. For each
dataset, we compare theBaseline accuracy on the original data, the
Static accuracy on perturbed data when the DNNs for attack prob-
ing and prediction are the same, the accuracy of our first randomiza-
tion schemeRandom-Model-nwhere there aren = 10, 20, 50mod-
els in the pool, the accuracy of the ensemble of the pool of DNNs in
our first randomization scheme Ensemble-n where n = 10, 20, 50,
the accuracy of the Ensemble Adversarial Training technique [40]
Ensemble-AdTrain and Ensemble-AdTrain combined with our
first randomization scheme Ensemble-AdTrain-Random, and
the accuracy of our second randomization scheme and its ensembles
Random-Weight and Random-Weight-n where n = 10, 20, 50.
Detailed explanations are given below.
4.1.1 Attacking and Predicting with A Static DNN. First, we in-
vestigate the influence of the adversarial samples on the same
DNN model that has been provided to the attacker to compute
the adversarial samples. In Figure 4 ( and Tables 3, 4, and 5 in
Appendix A), Static corresponds to the accuracy of the attacked
DNN model on the adversarial samples when the confidence value
conf = 0, 5, 10, 20, respectively. In all cases, the attacks succeeded
with nearly 100% success rate, and the accuracy of the DNN model
dropped significantly—nearly 0% in all three cases and vanished in
the plots, compared to the Baseline accuracy on the non-attacked
samples.
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Figure 4: Results of targeted L2 adversarial attacks on
CIFAR-10, MNIST, and Traffic Sign datasets.
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4.1.2 Attacking and Predicting with A Randomly Selected DNN.
We are interested in finding out what would happen if we hold on
to some pre-trained DNN models. In other words, the attacker gets
to randomly pick a model fa from a pool of models to attack, and
use it to generate the adversarial sample. We then randomly select a
DNN fp , with a probability P(fa = fp ) ≤ 1n where n is the number
of DNNs in the pool, to make the prediction for the adversarial
sample. We set the pool size to 10, 20, and 50, respectively, shown as
Random-10,Random-20, andRandom-50 in the figure (and the
tables). It is clear that by keeping some pre-trained DNNs secrete,
the adversary failed to fool the DNN that is randomly selected from
the pool of DNNs on the CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets. On the
German Traffic Sign dataset, the attack success rate is greater, but
not as devastating.
4.1.3 Attacking A Randomly Selected DNN and Predicting with
An Ensemble of DNNs. Naturally, the next question is what if we use
the ensemble of the pool. Again, the adversary has random access
to one of the DNN models in the pool to generate the adversarial
sample, but we are going to use the majority vote of the DNN
models to make the final prediction for the adversarial sample. The
results are shown in the figure as Ensemble-10, Ensemble-20,
and Ensemble-50, respectively. The ensemble approach has even
better success in mitigating adversarial attacks. In some cases, it
has better accuracy than the Baseline. Even on the German Traffic
Sign dataset, the ensemble achieved significantly better accuracy
than the single random DNN model.
4.1.4 Comparing to Ensemble Adversarial Training. Now the
question is: can we do better than Ensemble Adversarial Train-
ing? The results of Ensemble Adversarial Training are shown as
Ensemble-AdTrain in the figure, and they are as poor as the
Static DNN, with nearly 0% accuracy across all datasets under
different confidence values. This makes sense as the adversarial
learning process is essentially an arms race between the defender
and the attacker. As long as the attacker has the learned model,
he/she can apply the same attack strategy all over again, and defeat
the new model. We again demonstrate the power of randomness
by setting a pool of 10 Ensemble-AdTrain DNNs, and repeat the
experiments as described in the previous case, and the results are
nearly as good as those of our random approach. On the German
Traffic Sign, Ensemble-AdTrain even outperformed our random
approach.
4.1.5 Attacking A DNN and Predicting with the Random-Weight
DNN. Our second randomization approach may sound naïve at first.
In this approach, we simply take a trained DNN model, and then
add a small Gaussian random noise to its weights, and use it to
make predictions for the adversarial samples. The results, shown as
Random-Weight in the figure, are surprisingly strong when the
attacker is not aggressive, that is, when the confidence value is zero.
By adding small random noise to the trained DNN, we improve the
accuracy by as much as 69.7% on the CIFAR-10 dataset, 66.3% on
the MNIST dataset, and 41.4% on the Traffic Sign dataset, compared
to the Static DNN.
4.1.6 Attacking A DNN and Predicting with the Ensemble of
Random-Weight DNNs. The problem with the Random-Weight
DNN is that when the attack intensifies with higher confidence
values, it immediately degraded to the Static DNN. Naturally, we
consider the ensemble of a set of Random-Weight DNNs. Note
that generating a pool ofRandom-Weight DNNs is very cheap, in-
volving no re-training. The results are shown asRandom-Weight-
10, Random-Weight-20, and Random-Weight-50 in the figure.
The ensemble has significant improvement on the MNIST dataset
when the confidence is zero, but not so much on the other two
datasets. However, the ensemble appears to be significantly more
resilient to attacks when the confidence value gets larger.
When the attack intensity increases, the strength of our random
approaches decreases, but the ensemble can slow down the deteri-
oration. Nevertheless, transferability should not be automatically
assumed, and there is a good chance that a simple workaround such
as adding random noise to the trained model would alleviate the
problem.
4.2 L2 Untargeted Attacks
In this experiment, we consider an adversary who has no desired
target class and his/her goal is solely to get a sample misclassified.
Figure 5 shows the results on all three datasets.
Similar to the case of targeted attacks presented in the previous
section, the untargeted attacks are also very successful when the
adversary has access to the DNNmodel, shown as Static in Figure 5
and Tables 6, 7, and 8 in Appendix A. The ensemble adversarial
training technique, shown as Ensemble-AdTrain, also has no or
very little resilience to untargeted attacks.
Both of our randomization techniques significantly improve the
robustness of the DNN models.
■ The ensembles of the DNNs in our first randomization tech-
nique Ensemble-n with n = 10, 20, 50 are the strongest
against untargeted attacks. On the CIFAR-10 dataset,Ensemble-
n is even better than the Baseline when the confidence
value of the attack is less than 20.
■ Our first randomization technique Random-Model-n is
generally better than the second randomization technique
Random-Weight. However, when the attacks are untar-
geted, theRandom-Weight technique demonstratesmuch
stronger resilience to the untargeted attacks than the tar-
geted attacks (compared to the results shown in Figure 4).
■ The ensemble of Random-Weight DNNs is also more
resilient to untargeted attacks than the single Random-
WeightDNN. An interesting observation is that the ensem-
ble of Random-Weight becomes slightly weaker against
adversarial attacks when the number of random-weight
DNNs increases.
4.3 L∞ Targeted Attacks
Stochastic Activation Pruning (SAP), proposed by Dhillon et al. [15]
earlier this year, introduces randomness into a neural network by
randomly dropping some neurons of each layer (dropout) with a
weighted probability. Carlini and Wager were able to defeat SAP
by reducing its accuracy to 0% with ϵ = 0.031 with their latest
projected gradient descent (PGD) attack. PGD attacks measure
closeness in terms of L∞ norm. The attack takes into consideration
the ineffectiveness of previous single-step attacks when facing
randomness. In this new attack, they compute the gradient with the
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Figure 5: Results of untargeted L2 adversarial attacks on
CIFAR-10, MNIST, and Traffic Sign datasets.
expectation over instantiations of randomness. Therefore, at each
iteration of gradient descent, they compute a move in the direction
of
k∑
i=1
▽x f (x).
Since larger pool sizes in our randomization techniques do not
make significant differences, in this experiment, we set the pool
size to 10. For our first randomization technique, smaller pool sizes
also mean less computational cost. For our second randomization
technique, larger pool sizes do not increase the cost, but in general
reduce the resilience to attacks as the pool size grows.
4.3.1 Results on the CIFAR-10 Dataset. The severity of attacks is
controlled with ϵ . Larger ϵ values give the adversary more budget
to perturb the data. Figure 6 shows the impact of the ϵ value on the
CIFAR-10 dataset. The original image is given on the left side, and
the perturbed image is given on the right side. For different datasets,
different ϵ values are needed to model the same level of attack
intensity. For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we set ϵ = {0.01, 0.03, 0.08},
and PGD search steps k to 10.
ϵ = 0.01
ϵ = 0.03
ϵ = 0.08
Figure 6: Quality of CIFAR-10 images after L∞ adversarial
attacks with different ϵ values.
Figure 7 shows the results of the targeted L∞ attacks on the
CIFAR-10 dataset. When ϵ = 0.01 the attack is very mild. Even the
accuracy of the Static DNN model is 74.5%, and the Ensemble-
AdTrain technique has a slightly higher accuracy of 78.7%. The
accuracy of our Random-Model-10 (82.5%) on the perturbed sam-
ples is similar to theBaseline accuracy 83.7%, while the randomized
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random has an accuracy of 83.2%. The en-
semble of the DNNs in our random-model technique has a higher
accuracy (87.6%) than the Baseline accuracy. Our random-weight
technique Random-Weight has a slightly better accuracy (77.7%)
than the Static model.
When attacks intensify with ϵ = 0.03, the accuracy of the Static
DNN model dropped significantly to 43.5%, while the Ensemble-
AdTrain technique does show greater resilience with an accuracy
of 54.4%. Our Random-Model-10 demonstrates strong robustness
on the perturbed samples, with an accuracy of 71.7%, while the ran-
domized Ensemble-AdTrain-Random has an accuracy of 76.1%.
This suggests re-training on adversarial samples does help improve
the accuracy on perturbed data. The robustness of the ensemble of
the DNNs in our random-model technique is very impressive, with
an accuracy of 84.8%, even slightly better than the Baseline ac-
curacy of 84.2%. Our random-weight technique Random-Weight
also shows solid robustness against the targeted L∞ attacks, with
an accuracy of 77.5%, significantly better than the Static model.
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Figure 7: Results of targeted L∞ adversarial attacks on the
CIFAR-10 dataset.
The ensemble of Random-Weight DNNs is less impressive, but
still significantly better, with an accuracy of 67.3%, than the Static
model and the Ensemble-AdTrain model.
When ϵ = 0.08, the attack is so severe that it is difficult for
humans to recognize the objects in the images. Not surprisingly,
the accuracy of the Static DNN model dropped to 15.8%, and simi-
larly the accuracy of the Ensemble-AdTrain technique dropped
to 22.5%. Our Random-Model-10 demonstrates strong robustness
to such strong attacks with an accuracy of 58.1%, while the ran-
domized Ensemble-AdTrain-Random has a better accuracy of
68.1%. The ensemble of the DNNs in our random-model technique is
as robust as the randomized Ensemble-AdTrain-Random, with
an accuracy of 66.5%. Our random-weight technique Random-
Weight also shows better robustness than the Static model, with
an accuracy of 58.6%. The ensemble of Random-Weight DNNs is
again more vulnerable than the single Random-Weight DNN, but
still significantly better, with an accuracy of 53.5%, than the Static
model and the Ensemble-AdTrain model.
4.3.2 Results on the MNIST Dataset. For the MNIST dataset,
we set ϵ = {0.2, 0.3, 0.4} and PGD search steps k to 10. When
ϵ ≥ 0.5, the entire image is filled with black pixels, and no learning
models are better than random guessing. Figure 8 shows the image
distortion by the targeted L∞ attacks on the MNIST dataset with
ϵ = {0.2, 0.3, 0.4}.
Figure 9 shows the results on the MNIST dataset. When ϵ = 0.2,
the accuracy of the Static DNN model is 85.4%, about 15% lower
than the Baseline accuracy of 99.2%. The accuracy of Ensemble-
AdTrain is 90.9%. Again, this demonstrates the effectiveness of
increasing model robustness by re-training on perturbed samples.
The accuracy of ourRandom-Model-10 on the perturbed samples
is 95.4%, 3% lower than the accuracy (98.4%) of its ensemble coun-
terpart. The randomized Ensemble-AdTrain-Random has an ac-
curacy of 96.9%, 6% better than the plain Ensemble-AdTrain tech-
nique. Our random-weight technique Random-Weight also has a
solid accuracy (96.4%), so does its ensemble counterpart (96.4%).
When ϵ = 0.3, the accuracy of the Static DNN model dropped
to 55.8%, while the accuracy of Ensemble-AdTrain dropped to
64.3%. Both are significant performance drop compared to the
Baseline accuracy of 99.3%. Our Random-Model-10 has an ac-
curacy of 80.0%, 13.6% lower than the accuracy of its ensemble
ϵ = 0.2
ϵ = 0.3
ϵ = 0.4
Figure 8: Quality of MNIST images after L∞ adversarial at-
tacks with different ϵ values.
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Figure 9: Results of targeted L∞ adversarial attacks on the
MNIST dataset.
counterpart Ensemble-10, with an accuracy of 93.6%. The reason
of the large difference between the two random-model techniques
is that the DNN selected for adversary happened to be the same
as the one chosen for making predictions many times during the
experiment withRandom-Model-10. The randomizedEnsemble-
AdTrain-Random has an accuracy of 87.1%. Our random-weight
technique Random-Weight has a similar accuracy of 87.3%, sig-
nificantly more robust than the Static model. The ensemble of
Random-Weight DNNs is still better than the Static model and
the Ensemble-AdTrain model, with an accuracy of 79.4%.
When ϵ = 0.4, the accuracy of the Static DNN model dropped
to 28.0% and the accuracy of the Ensemble-AdTrain technique
8
dropped to 29.4%. Our Random-Model-10 mitigates the impact
of the strong attacks with an accuracy of 60.3%, while Ensemble-
10 is again more than 14% better, with an accuracy of 74.6%, for
the same reason—frequently, the model randomly chosen for pre-
diction happened to be the model used for computing adversar-
ial samples during the experiment with Random-Model-10. The
randomized Ensemble-AdTrain-Random has a solid accuracy of
67.8%. Our random-weight techniqueRandom-Weight also shows
better robustness than the Static model, with an accuracy of 64.5%.
The ensemble of ten Random-Weight DNNs is as usual less ro-
bust than the single Random-Weight DNN, with an accuracy of
60.7%, but still significantly better than the Static model and the
Ensemble-AdTrain model.
4.3.3 Results on the Traffic Sign Dataset. For the German Traffic
Sign dataset, we set ϵ = {0.03, 0.06, 0.09} to achieve similar levels
of attack intensity and PGD search size k = 10. Figure 10 shows
the distortion of the targeted L∞ attacks on the Traffic Sign dataset
with ϵ = {0.03, 0.06, 0.09}.
ϵ = 0.03
ϵ = 0.06
ϵ = 0.09
Figure 10: Quality of Traffic Sign images afterL∞ adversarial
attacks with different ϵ values.
Figure 11 shows the results of the various DNN models. This is
the only dataset for which our random-model technique Random-
Model-10 cannot achieve an accuracy to compete closely with the
Baseline accuracy when the attack is targeted and relatively mild
(with ϵ = 0.03). The small variance (±0.025) in accuracy implies
that this lagging in accuracy is not caused by randomly choosing
the same DNNmodel as the adversary did. We will discuss the cause
of this weakness by investigating the weight differential entropy
between this dataset and the other two in Section 4.5.
When ϵ = 0.03, the accuracy of the Static DNN model is 76.9%,
nearly 20% lower than the Baseline accuracy of 96.0%. The accu-
racy of Ensemble-AdTrain is 82.0%, more than 5% better than the
accuracy of the Static DNN model. The accuracy of our Random-
Model-10, as mentioned earlier is 85.4%, about 10% lower than
the Baseline accuracy, and more than 5% lower than the accuracy
(91.1%) of its ensemble counterpart. The randomized Ensemble-
AdTrain-Random has an accuracy of 90.4%, nearly 8% better than
the non-randomized Ensemble-AdTrain technique. Our random-
weight technique Random-Weight also has a solid accuracy of
85.6%, about 9% better than the Static accuracy. The ensemble of
ten random-weight DNNs also has an accuracy of 85.3%.
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Figure 11: Results of targeted L∞ adversarial attacks on the
German Traffic Sign dataset.
When ϵ = 0.06, the accuracy of the Static DNN model dropped
to 46.5% and the accuracy of Ensemble-AdTrain dropped to 49.1%,
approximately 50% drop from the Baseline accuracy of 96.0%. Our
Random-Model-10 has an accuracy of 64.7%, about 10.0% lower
than the accuracy of its ensemble counterpart Ensemble-10 at
74.9%. This can be explained by the relatively large variance in
accuracy (±0.100) caused by randomly encountering the same mod-
els used by the adversary during the experiment. The random-
ized Ensemble-AdTrain-Random has an accuracy of 79.2%. Our
random-weight technique Random-Weight has an accuracy of
69.8%, about 23% more robust than the Static model. The ensemble
of Random-Weight DNNs has a similar accuracy of 68.4%.
When ϵ = 0.09, both the Static model and the Ensemble-
AdTrainmodel have a very low accuracy of about 26%. OurRandom-
Model-10 has a reduced accuracy of 51.2% with a relatively large
variance of ±0.102, while Ensemble-10 is 9% more accurate at
60.7%. The randomized Ensemble-AdTrain-Random has a very
solid accuracy of 75.0%. Our random-weight technique Random-
Weight has better robustness than our Random-Model-10, with
an accuracy of 58.2%. The ensemble of tenRandom-WeightDNNs
has an accuracy of 54.9%, also better than Random-Model-10,
and significantly better than the Static model and the Ensemble-
AdTrain model.
In summary, the ensemble of the DNN models in our first ran-
domization technique is most robust against targeted L∞ attacks, the
single DNN random-model technique is the second robust model,
followed by the single DNN random-weight technique. Ensem-
ble adversarial training alone is as weak as the Static model, but
9
combined with our first randomization technique, its robustness
improved significantly and has the potential to exceed the perfor-
mance of all the other techniques when the attack is severe, on
condition that its large variance can be reduced by introducing
more component Ensemble-AdTrain DNNs.
subsectionL∞ Untargeted Attacks
We repeat the experiments presented in Section 4.3, with untar-
geted L∞ attacks. For the same ϵ values, we had to set the search
step to 100 to reach the same level of desired attacks. We believe
the projected gradient descent technique works effectively when
facing randomness, but not efficiently when facing a single static
DNN model. The gradient computed as the expectation over instan-
tiations of randomness is not optimized for attacking a single DNN
model in the white-box, untargeted fashion.
Figure 12 shows the results of untargeted L∞ attacks on the three
datasets. The same conclusions can be drawn from this experiment:
■ Randomization techniques are clearly more robust than the
static DNN model and the Ensemble Adversarial Training
technique, regardless of attack intensity.
■ The ensemble of the DNN models in our first randomiza-
tion technique is most resilient to untargeted adversarial
data perturbation.
■ Re-training on adversarial samples makes marginal im-
provement on robustness, but has a great potential to be a
solid adversarial learning technique if combined with our
first randomization technique.
■ The spread of the distribution of the DNN models in the
version space is sufficiently large such that adding a small
random noise to the trained weights can significantly im-
prove the robustness of a DNN model.
More detailed experimental results can be found in Tables 12, 13,
and 14 in Appendix A.
4.4 Random-Weight DNNs on Non-perturbed
Test Data
In our second randomization technique, we propose to improve the
robustness of a trained DNN by adding a small Gaussian random
noise to its weight.We demonstrate in our experiments that this sim-
ple but efficient technique can significantly improve the robustness
of a DNN model. We now show that our Random-Weight DNN
does not fail on the non-perturbed data, and can have the same ac-
curacy on the test set as the original DNN model. Table 2 shows the
accuracy of a trained DNN model and its randomized counterpart
Random-Weight DNN on the non-attacked test dataset. As can be
observed, adding small Gaussian random noise to the DNN model
does not have any impact on its accuracy on the non-attacked test
data.
Table 2: The accuracy of our Random-Weight DNNs on the
non-perturbed test data.
Original DNN Random-Weight DNN
CIFAR-10 0.840 ± 0.010 0.833 ± 0.004
MNIST 0.993 ± 0.003 0.993 ± 0.001
Traffic Sign 0.963 ± 0.006 0.962 ± 0.004
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Figure 12: Results of untargeted L∞ adversarial attacks on
the CIFAR-10, MNIST and German Traffic Sign datasets.
4.5 Differential Entropy of DNNs for Three
Datasets
We discussed in Section 3.2 how we can measure the spread of the
DNN distribution in the version space by estimating the differential
entropy of their weight distributions. Higher differential entropy
indicates more variance in the DNN distribution, and harder for
adversarial samples to transfer from one model to another. In Sec-
tion 4.3.3, we observe that our random-model technique Random-
Model-10 cannot compete closely with the Baseline accuracy on
the German Traffic Sign dataset, even when the attack is relatively
mild. We also observe that the lagging in accuracy is not caused
by choosing the same DNN model as the adversary did. Now we
show that the distribution of the DNN models built on the Traffic
Sign dataset has smaller differential entropy, compared to the DNN
models built for the other two datasets.
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Figure 13: Differential entropy of DNN models built on the
CIFAR-10, MNIST and German Traffic Sign datasets.
Figure 13 shows the estimated differential entropy for theweights
to each node in the DNNs built from the three datasets. Since the
true underlying distribution of the DNN models is unknown, we
measure the logarithm of the absolute value of |Σ|—the determinant
of the covariance matrix of the weights. As can be observed, with
very few exceptions, the differential entropy of the DNNs for CIFAR
and MNIST datasets is greater than that of the Traffic Sign dataset,
which further supports our hypothesis that a larger variance in the
DNN distribution implies more difficult attack through transferabil-
ity. It also explains the question we raised in Section 4.3.3 that on
the Traffic Sign dataset our first randomization technique cannot
closely approach the Baseline accuracy, unlike on the other two
datasets when the attack is relatively mild.
5 DISCUSSIONS
Naturally, a subsequent question to ask is how to break the random-
ization techniques from the adversary’s perspective. The adversary
can query our randomized DNNs and get a set of data labeled. One
thing the adversary can do with the dataset is to build a model
on that dataset and compute adversarial samples from the learned
model. The other thing the adversary can do is to train an ensemble
of n models with that dataset and compute adversarial samples
from the ensemble model.
We argue that none of these strategies would be effective, as
long as we can get a similar set of data as the adversary did. This
is easier for us since we have all the models and we can simulate
adversary’s probing behavior to get a similar set of data. Suppose
the adversary builds a new model f on dataset D, we can build a
set of different models on a similar dataset D ′ ≈ D with stochastic
gradient descent. Even if the adversary builds an ensemble, we
can build a pool of different ensembles from that dataset. Now the
problem circles back to the same one we tackle in this paper: the
adversary has perfect knowledge of one model (single or ensemble),
and we keep a set of various models trained on the same/similar
data from the adversary. As long as variances in decision boundaries
are large enough, our randomization techniques would be robust to
adversarial attacks. There are two additional methods we can use
to further improve the robustness of our randomization techniques:
1.) we can combine our two randomization techniques: at each
query request, we randomly select a model and add a small random
noise to its weights before we answer the query; and 2.) we can
re-train a set of DNNs on the adversarial samples we compute and
use our randomization techniques with the re-trained DNNs. We
have demonstrated in our experiments that the latter approach has
a great potential to exceed all the other randomization techniques
we have presented earlier.
Of course this cat and mouse game cannot go on forever. Eventu-
ally, the adversary would stop further attacking to preserve adver-
sarial utility. If the attack budget is unlimited, there is no defense
that could effectively mitigate such arbitrary attacks.
We experiment on the ideas of attacking the ensembles of DNNs,
and defending them by adding random noise to the weights of the
DNNs as we discussed earlier. Successfully attacking the ensemble
evidently requires much greater data perturbation than attacking a
single DNN, as shown in Figure 14 in the case of targeted L2 attacks
and Figure 15 in the case of untargeted L2 attacks. Given a confi-
dence value, the blue bar shows the perturbation required to defeat
a single DNN, while the red bar shows the required perturbation
for defeating an ensemble of 10 DNNs.
We create an ensemble of DNNs by randomly selecting 10 DNNs
from a pool of 100 DNNs. When facing significantly greater data
perturbation by targeted attacks, we observe that without random-
ization, that is, the ensemble for attack Ea is the same as the en-
semble for prediction Ep , any ensemble of DNNs (Ep = Ea ) would
be foiled completely, with its accuracy disappearing in the plots
under the label of static_ensemble in Figure 16. The last bar in
each group shows the accuracy on the unattacked images. If we
predict with a different ensemble (i.e. Ep , Ea ) by randomly select-
ing another 10 DNNs (with replacement) from the pool, when the
attack confidence is zero (Conf = 0) we can successfully mitigate
the attacks, labeled as random_ensemble in the figure. This type
of randomization becomes less effective when the attack confidence
is larger, especially when Conf ≥ 10. This is understandable since
the distortion on the original image is noticeably intensified.
We also tested the idea of predicting with one of the DNNs
in Ep after Ea has been attacked. The results are labeled as ran-
dom_single in Figure 16. When Conf = 0 a single DNN is less
resilient to attacks compared to an ensemble of DNN. However,
when Conf ≥ 5 the majority voting scheme breaks down because
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Figure 14: Data perturbation required for successful tar-
geted L2 attacks against ensemble DNNs on CIFAR-10,
MNIST, and Traffic Sign datasets.
of the weak component DNNs, and the ensemble becomes worse
than the single DNN.
We further introduce randomization by adding noise to the
weights of each of theDNNs in the ensemble, shown as random_std_x
in Figure 16 where x is the value of the standard deviation used to
generate the random noise. As can be observed, when x is small,
the accuracy on the unattacked data is high and the randomization
scheme works well when Conf = 0. As x increases, the accuracy
on the unattacked data drops, so is the accuracy of the randomized
DNN ensemble for Conf = 0. On the other hand, the accuracy of
the randomized DNN ensemble increases for Conf > 0. Therefore,
it is important to choose an x to keep a good balance between
accuracy on the attacked and the unattacked data.
Among the three datasets, our randomizationwith randomweights
technique works extremely well on the MNIST dataset, followed
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Figure 15: Data perturbation required for successful un-
targeted L2 attacks against ensemble DNNs on CIFAR-10,
MNIST, and Traffic Sign datasets.
by the CIFAR-10 dataset, and Traffic Sign dataset. For the Traf-
fic Sign dataset, we already know its differential entropy is much
lower, therefore randomization is least effective on this dataset
although it is still much more resilient than static_ensemble and
random_ensemble.
Similar results are obtained for the untargeted attacks, as shown
in Figure 17.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the nature of transferability of perturbed data. We
believe that transferability should not be automatically assumed
in a learning task. It strongly ties to the spread of the DNN model
distribution in the version space and the severity of adversarial
attacks. We present two randomization techniques for robust DNN
learning. Our first randomization technique involves training a
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Figure 16: Accuracy of different DNN classifiers facing
targeted L2 attacks on CIFAR-10, MNIST, and Traffic Sign
datasets.
pool of DNNs. For each query request, a DNN model randomly
selected from the pool is used to answer the query. We assume the
adversary has the complete knowledge of one of the DNN models,
and the rest are kept secret to the adversary. We also investigate
the robustness of the ensemble of the subset of the DNN models.
In our second randomization technique, we simply train one DNN
model, and add a small Gaussian random noise to the weights of the
model. This approach is computationally efficient. Our experimen-
tal results demonstrate that the ensemble of the DNNs in our first
randomization technique is most robust, sometimes exceeding the
accuracy of the DNN model on non-attacked samples. Our second
randomization technique is also significantly more robust against
adversarial attacks, including both targeted and untargeted attacks.
We demonstrate that re-training on the adversarial samples alone
will not improve robustness, but combined with our first random-
ization technique, the ensemble adversarial training may have a
great potential of being the most robust technique.
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Figure 17: Accuracy of different DNN classifiers facing un-
targeted L2 attacks on CIFAR-10, MNIST, and Traffic Sign
datasets.
REFERENCES
[1] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David A. Wagner. 2018. Obfuscated Gra-
dients Give a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial
Examples. CoRR abs/1802.00420 (2018).
[2] Peter Auer and Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi. 1998. On-line learning with malicious noise
and the closure algorithm. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 23,
1-2 (Jan. 1998), 83–99.
[3] Marco Barreno, Blaine Nelson, Anthony D. Joseph, and J. D. Tygar. 2010. The
Security of Machine Learning. Mach. Learn. 81, 2 (Nov. 2010), 121–148.
[4] Osbert Bastani, Yani Ioannou, Leonidas Lampropoulos, Dimitrios Vytiniotis,
Aditya V. Nori, and Antonio Criminisi. 2016. Measuring Neural Net Robustness
with Constraints. In NIPS. 2613–2621.
[5] Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Daniel Cullina, and Prateek Mittal. 2016. Dimensionality
Reduction as a Defense against Evasion Attacks on Machine Learning Classifiers.
CoRR abs/1704.02654 (2016).
[6] M. Bruckner and T. Scheffer. 2011. Stackelberg Games for Adversarial Prediction
Problems. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. ACM.
[7] Nader H. Bshouty, Nadav Eiron, and Eyal Kushilevitz. 1999. PAC learning with
nasty noise. Theoretical Computer Science 288 (1999), 2002.
[8] Jacob Buckman, Aurko Roy, Colin Raffel, and Ian Goodfellow. 2018. Thermometer
Encoding: One Hot Way To Resist Adversarial Examples. In International Confer-
ence on Learning Representations. https://openreview.net/forum?id=S18Su--CW
[9] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. 2017. Adversarial Examples Are Not Easily
Detected: Bypassing Ten Detection Methods. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM
Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISec ’17). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 3–14. https://doi.org/10.1145/3128572.3140444
13
[10] Nicholas Carlini and David A. Wagner. 2017. Towards Evaluating the Robustness
of Neural Networks. 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) (2017),
39–57.
[11] Krzysztof Chalupka, Pietro Perona, and Frederick Eberhardt. 2015. Visual Causal
Feature Learning. In UAI. AUAI Press, 181–190.
[12] Thomas M. Cover and Joy A. Thomas. 2006. Elements of Information Theory
(Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing). Wiley-Interscience,
New York, NY, USA.
[13] Nilesh Dalvi, Pedro Domingos, Mausam, Sumit Sanghai, and Deepak Verma. 2004.
Adversarial classification. In Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD international
conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining (KDD ’04). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 99–108.
[14] O. Dekel and O. Shamir. 2008. Learning to classify with missing and corrupted
features. In Proceedings of the International Conference onMachine Learning. ACM,
216–223.
[15] Guneet S. Dhillon, Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Jeremy D. Bernstein, Jean Kossaifi,
Aran Khanna, Zachary C. Lipton, and Animashree Anandkumar. 2018. Stochastic
activation pruning for robust adversarial defense. In International Conference on
Learning Representations. https://openreview.net/forum?id=H1uR4GZRZ
[16] R. Feinman, R. R. Curtin, S. Shintre, and A. B. Gardner. 2017. Detecting Adversar-
ial Samples fromArtifacts. ArXiv e-prints (March 2017). arXiv:stat.ML/1703.00410
[17] Amir Globerson and Sam Roweis. 2006. Nightmare at test time: robust learning
by feature deletion. In Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Machine
learning (ICML ’06). ACM, 353–360.
[18] Ian Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. 2015. Explaining
and Harnessing Adversarial Examples. In International Conference on Learning
Representations. http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572
[19] Kathrin Grosse, Praveen Manoharan, Nicolas Papernot, Michael Backes, and
Patrick D. McDaniel. 2017. On the (Statistical) Detection of Adversarial Examples.
CoRR abs/1702.06280 (2017).
[20] Chuan Guo, Mayank Rana, Moustapha Cisse, and Laurens van der Maaten.
2018. Countering Adversarial Images using Input Transformations. In Interna-
tional Conference on Learning Representations. https://openreview.net/forum?id=
SyJ7ClWCb
[21] DanHendrycks and Kevin Gimpel. 2017. EarlyMethods for Detecting Adversarial
Images. In International Conference on Learning Representations Workshop. https:
//arxiv.org/abs/1608.00530
[22] Sebastian Houben, Johannes Stallkamp, Jan Salmen, Marc Schlipsing, and Chris-
tian Igel. 2013. Detection of Traffic Signs in Real-World Images: The German
Traffic Sign Detection Benchmark. In International Joint Conference on Neural
Networks.
[23] Murat Kantarcioglu, Bowei Xi, and Chris Clifton. 2011. Classifier evaluation
and attribute selection against active adversaries. Data Min. Knowl. Discov. 22
(January 2011), 291–335. Issue 1-2.
[24] Michael Kearns and Ming Li. 1993. Learning in the Presence of Malicious Errors.
SIAM J. Comput. 22 (1993), 807–837.
[25] Alex Krizhevsky, Vinod Nair, and Geoffrey Hinton. 2009. CIFAR-10 (Canadian
Institute for Advanced Research). (2009). http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.
html
[26] Yann LeCun and Corinna Cortes. 2010. MNIST handwritten digit database.
http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/. (2010). http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
[27] Xin Li and Fuxin Li. 2016. Adversarial Examples Detection in Deep Networks
with Convolutional Filter Statistics. CoRR abs/1612.07767 (2016).
[28] Yanpei Liu, Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, and Dawn Song. 2017. Delving in to trans-
ferable adversarial examples and black-box attacks. In International Conference
on Learning Representations. https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.02770
[29] Daniel Lowd and Christopher Meek. 2005. Adversarial learning. In Proceedings
of the eleventh ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery in
data mining (KDD ’05). 641–647.
[30] Xingjun Ma, Bo Li, Yisen Wang, Sarah M. Erfani, Sudanthi Wijewickrema, Grant
Schoenebeck, Michael E. Houle, Dawn Song, and James Bailey. 2018. Charac-
terizing Adversarial Subspaces Using Local Intrinsic Dimensionality. In Interna-
tional Conference on Learning Representations. https://openreview.net/forum?id=
B1gJ1L2aW
[31] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras,
and Adrian Vladu. 2018. Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adver-
sarial Attacks. In International Conference on Learning Representations. https:
//openreview.net/forum?id=rJzIBfZAb
[32] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, and Ian Goodfellow. 2016. Transferability
in machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks using adversarial
samples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07277 (2016).
[33] Nicolas Papernot, PatrickMcDaniel, Ian Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z. Berkay Celik,
and Ananthram Swami. 2017. Practical Black-Box Attacks Against Machine
Learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (ASIA CCS ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 506–519.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3053009
[34] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh Jha, and Ananthram Swami.
2016. instillation as a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neural
networks. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP).
[35] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick D. McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh Jha, and Ananthram
Swami. 2016. Distillation as a Defense to Adversarial Perturbations Against Deep
Neural Networks. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer
Society, 582–597.
[36] Pouya Samangouei, Maya Kabkab, and Rama Chellappa. 2018. Defense-GAN:
Protecting Classifiers Against Adversarial Attacks Using Generative Models. In
International Conference on Learning Representations. https://openreview.net/
forum?id=BkJ3ibb0-
[37] Yang Song, Taesup Kim, Sebastian Nowozin, Stefano Ermon, and Nate Kush-
man. 2018. PixelDefend: Leveraging Generative Models to Understand and
Defend against Adversarial Examples. In International Conference on Learning
Representations. https://openreview.net/forum?id=rJUYGxbCW
[38] Jörg Stoye. 2011. Statistical Decisions Under Ambiguity. Theory and Decision 70,
2 (2011), 129–148.
[39] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru
Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. 2014. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. In International Conference on Learning Representations. http://arxiv.
org/abs/1312.6199
[40] Florian Tramer, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Dan Boneh, and Patrick Mc-
Daniel. 2018. Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks AND Defenses. In Interna-
tional Conference on Learning Representations. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.03453.
pdf
[41] Abraham Wald. 1939. Contributions to the Theory of Statistical Estimation
and Testing Hypotheses. Ann. Math. Statist. 10, 4 (12 1939), 299–326. https:
//doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177732144
[42] Abraham Wald. 1945. Statistical Decision Functions Which Minimize the Maxi-
mum Risk. Annals of Mathematics 46 (1945), 265–280.
[43] Cihang Xie, Jianyu Wang, Zhishuai Zhang, Zhou Ren, and Alan Yuille. 2018. Mit-
igating Adversarial Effects Through Randomization. In International Conference
on Learning Representations. https://openreview.net/forum?id=Sk9yuql0Z
[44] Stephan Zheng, Yang Song, Thomas Leung, and Ian J. Goodfellow. 2016. Improv-
ing the Robustness of Deep Neural Networks via Stability Training. In CVPR.
IEEE Computer Society, 4480–4488.
[45] Yan Zhou, Murat Kantarcioglu, Bhavani Thuraisingham, and Bowei Xi. 2012.
Adversarial support vector machine learning. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM
SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining (KDD
’12). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1059–1067. https://doi.org/10.1145/2339530.
2339697
A TABLES OF DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS
We present all the tables that contain the detailed experimental re-
sults in this section. For L2 attacks with confidence values of 0, 5, 10,
and 20, each table lists the Baseline accuracy on the original data,
the Static accuracy on perturbed data when the same DNNs are
used for both attack probing and prediction, the accuracy of our first
randomization schemeRandom-Model-nwheren = 10, 20, 50, the
accuracy of the ensemble of the pool of DNNs in our first random-
ization scheme Ensemble-n where n = 10, 20, 50, the accuracy of
the ensemble adversarial training technique Ensemble-AdTrain
and Ensemble-AdTrain combined with our first randomization
scheme Ensemble-AdTrain-Random, and the accuracy of our
second randomization scheme and its ensemblesRandom-Weight
and Random-Weight-n where n = 10, 20, 50. For L∞ attacks with
various ϵ values, each tables lists the same results except for the
pool size of 20 and 50 in our randomization techniques.
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Table 3: Cifar-10 Targeted L2 Attack Results
Algorithm Conf = 0 Conf = 5 Conf = 10 Conf = 20
Baseline (no attack) 0.846 ± 0.009 0.846 ± 0.007 0.840 ± 0.013 0.839 ± 0.012
Static 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.001 ± 0.001
Random-Model-10 0.816 ± 0.010 0.789 ± 0.010 0.729 ± 0.020 0.589 ± 0.017
Random-Model-20 0.810 ± 0.011 0.708 ± 0.236 0.734 ± 0.013 0.464 ± 0.233
Random-Model-50 0.807 ± 0.015 0.763 ± 0.013 0.727 ± 0.013 0.575 ± 0.018
Ensemble-10 0.873 ± 0.008 0.845 ± 0.009 0.792 ± 0.007 0.637 ± 0.025
Ensemble-20 0.883 ± 0.011 0.856 ± 0.012 0.815 ± 0.009 0.618 ± 0.021
Ensemble-50 0.891 ± 0.009 0.869 ± 0.010 0.817 ± 0.015 0.630 ± 0.017
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.001 ± 0.001 0.002 ± 0.002
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.801 ± 0.012 0.786 ± 0.011 0.752 ± 0.018 0.640 ± 0.050
Random-Weight 0.697 ± 0.025 0.089 ± 0.021 0.002 ± 0.002 0.071 ± 0.003
Random-Weight-10 0.624 ± 0.021 0.504 ± 0.033 0.306 ± 0.047 0.543 ± 0.018
Random-Weight-20 0.607 ± 0.028 0.485 ± 0.031 0.550 ± 0.037 0.193 ± 0.037
Random-Weight-50 0.614 ± 0.055 0.500 ± 0.037 0.342 ± 0.034 0.289 ± 0.070
Mean Distortion 0.332 ± 0.005 0.510 ± 0.010 0.705 ± 0.020 1.153 ± 0.041
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 0.420 ± 0.016 0.671 ± 0.033 0.948 ± 0.070 1.611 ± 0.157
Table 4: MNIST Targeted L2 Attack Results
Algorithm Conf = 0 Conf = 5 Conf = 10 Conf = 20
Baseline (no attack) 0.993 ± 0.002 0.992 ± 0.003 0.993 ± 0.001 0.990 ± 0.003
Static 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
Random-Model-10 0.964 ± 0.016 0.924 ± 0.025 0.851 ± 0.069 0.529 ± 0.207
Random-Model-20 0.845 ± 0.283 0.906 ± 0.032 0.827 ± 0.065 0.590 ± 0.200
Random-Model-50 0.952 ± 0.014 0.925 ± 0.018 0.825 ± 0.055 0.596 ± 0.085
Ensemble-10 0.991 ± 0.002 0.972 ± 0.009 0.922 ± 0.022 0.633 ± 0.057
Ensemble-20 0.992 ± 0.002 0.971 ± 0.009 0.916 ± 0.037 0.702 ± 0.053
Ensemble-50 0.991 ± 0.004 0.978 ± 0.004 0.929 ± 0.018 0.674 ± 0.073
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.954 ± 0.025 0.944 ± 0.034 0.911 ± 0.060 0.801 ± 0.269
Random-Weight 0.663 ± 0.096 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
Random-Weight-10 0.733 ± 0.104 0.316 ± 0.147 0.051 ± 0.043 0.000 ± 0.000
Random-Weight-20 0.809 ± 0.039 0.482 ± 0.104 0.177 ± 0.084 0.014 ± 0.014
Random-Weight-50 0.696 ± 0.110 0.580 ± 0.119 0.384 ± 0.111 0.117 ± 0.068
Mean Distortion 1.586 ± 0.052 1.906 ± 0.049 2.212 ± 0.060 2.844 ± 0.093
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 1.473 ± 0.219 1.697 ± 0.257 1.965 ± 0.272 2.190 ± 0.208
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Table 5: Traffic Sign Targeted L2 Attack Results
Algorithm Conf = 0 Conf = 5 Conf = 10 Conf = 20
Baseline (no attack) 0.961 ± 0.006 0.960 ± 0.006 0.963 ± 0.006 0.958 ± 0.003
Static 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.001 ± 0.001
Random-Model-10 0.735 ± 0.029 0.528 ± 0.266 0.465 ± 0.235 0.417 ± 0.038
Random-Model-20 0.662 ± 0.223 0.610 ± 0.209 0.421 ± 0.278 0.332 ± 0.129
Random-Model-50 0.740 ± 0.042 0.687 ± 0.037 0.577 ± 0.067 0.334 ± 0.168
Ensemble-10 0.848 ± 0.015 0.778 ± 0.023 0.681 ± 0.027 0.439 ± 0.051
Ensemble-20 0.871 ± 0.019 0.809 ± 0.025 0.722 ± 0.025 0.485 ± 0.043
Ensemble-50 0.887 ± 0.019 0.822 ± 0.026 0.717 ± 0.052 0.479 ± 0.052
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.000 ± 0.000 0.003 ± 0.002 0.003 ± 0.002 0.008 ± 0.003
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.897 ± 0.017 0.677 ± 0.338 0.639 ± 0.319 0.671 ± 0.023
Random-Weight 0.414 ± 0.044 0.012 ± 0.008 0.001 ± 0.001 0.001 ± 0.002
Random-Weight-10 0.432 ± 0.038 0.255 ± 0.031 0.097 ± 0.027 0.009 ± 0.009
Random-Weight-20 0.405 ± 0.051 0.289 ± 0.034 0.202 ± 0.026 0.042 ± 0.015
Random-Weight-50 0.443 ± 0.042 0.226 ± 0.035 0.182 ± 0.039 0.089 ± 0.022
Mean Distortion 1.377 ± 0.066 1.765 ± 0.127 2.127 ± 0.121 3.402 ± 0.465
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 1.200 ± 0.040 2.050 ± 0.153 2.715 ± 0.163 4.263 ± 0.304
Table 6: Cifar-10 Untargeted L2 Attack Results
Algorithm Conf = 0 Conf = 5 Conf = 10 Conf = 20
Baseline (no attack) 0.835 ± 0.011 0.840 ± 0.010 0.838 ± 0.019 0.838 ± 0.014
Static 0.000 ± 0.000 0.003 ± 0.002 0.006 ± 0.002 0.011 ± 0.006
Random-Model-10 0.729 ± 0.243 0.639 ± 0.317 0.773 ± 0.017 0.733 ± 0.014
Random-Model-20 0.822 ± 0.017 0.803 ± 0.014 0.697 ± 0.232 0.653 ± 0.209
Random-Model-50 0.825 ± 0.010 0.713 ± 0.237 0.780 ± 0.009 0.734 ± 0.016
Ensemble-10 0.873 ± 0.008 0.835 ± 0.014 0.815 ± 0.011 0.762 ± 0.017
Ensemble-20 0.883 ± 0.011 0.858 ± 0.011 0.824 ± 0.012 0.775 ± 0.012
Ensemble-50 0.891 ± 0.009 0.858 ± 0.007 0.836 ± 0.006 0.786 ± 0.015
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.000 ± 0.000 0.003 ± 0.001 0.004 ± 0.002 0.014 ± 0.004
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.736 ± 0.246 0.643 ± 0.320 0.791 ± 0.014 0.751 ± 0.016
Random-Weight 0.686 ± 0.016 0.639 ± 0.020 0.481 ± 0.024 0.274 ± 0.031
Random-Weight-10 0.651 ± 0.029 0.645 ± 0.021 0.589 ± 0.031 0.531 ± 0.037
Random-Weight-20 0.558 ± 0.046 0.548 ± 0.053 0.513 ± 0.052 0.471 ± 0.049
Random-Weight-50 0.335 ± 0.052 0.331 ± 0.020 0.354 ± 0.070 0.331 ± 0.064
Mean Distortion 0.163 ± 0.006 0.552 ± 0.068 1.030 ± 0.083 1.991 ± 0.122
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 0.162 ± 0.005 0.582 ± 0.063 0.954 ± 0.067 1.854 ± 0.155
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Table 7: MNIST Untargeted L2 Attack Results
Algorithm Conf = 0 Conf = 5 Conf = 10 Conf = 20
Baseline (no attack) 0.992 ± 0.003 0.992 ± 0.002 0.992 ± 0.004 0.993 ± 0.002
Static 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
Random-Model-10 0.863 ± 0.289 0.781 ± 0.391 0.868 ± 0.290 0.967 ± 0.009
Random-Model-20 0.977 ± 0.006 0.965 ± 0.014 0.959 ± 0.018 0.854 ± 0.285
Random-Model-50 0.972 ± 0.009 0.968 ± 0.010 0.955 ± 0.011 0.958 ± 0.014
Ensemble-10 0.991 ± 0.002 0.988 ± 0.003 0.984 ± 0.004 0.985 ± 0.005
Ensemble-20 0.992 ± 0.002 0.989 ± 0.003 0.988 ± 0.004 0.987 ± 0.006
Ensemble-50 0.991 ± 0.004 0.991 ± 0.003 0.989 ± 0.003 0.988 ± 0.004
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.874 ± 0.291 0.779 ± 0.389 0.868 ± 0.290 0.963 ± 0.009
Random-Weight 0.742 ± 0.071 0.581 ± 0.090 0.456 ± 0.114 0.279 ± 0.142
Random-Weight-10 0.779 ± 0.078 0.711 ± 0.111 0.723 ± 0.097 0.681 ± 0.051
Random-Weight-20 0.756 ± 0.100 0.749 ± 0.091 0.731 ± 0.079 0.703 ± 0.083
Random-Weight-50 0.699 ± 0.080 0.742 ± 0.071 0.748 ± 0.070 0.759 ± 0.093
Mean Distortion 1.191 ± 0.059 1.155 ± 0.067 1.241 ± 0.056 1.236 ± 0.051
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 1.433 ± 0.047 1.445 ± 0.031 1.479 ± 0.040 1.540 ± 0.041
Table 8: Traffic Sign Untargeted L2 Attack Results
Algorithm Conf = 0 Conf = 5 Conf = 10 Conf = 20
Baseline (no attack) 0.962 ± 0.007 0.964 ± 0.004 0.967 ± 0.005 0.962 ± 0.005
Static 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.001 0.001 ± 0.001 0.001 ± 0.001
Random-Model-10 0.795 ± 0.265 0.695 ± 0.348 0.779 ± 0.261 0.692 ± 0.346
Random-Model-20 0.886 ± 0.042 0.781 ± 0.261 0.778 ± 0.260 0.780 ± 0.260
Random-Model-50 0.871 ± 0.029 0.875 ± 0.025 0.865 ± 0.025 0.850 ± 0.033
Ensemble-10 0.848 ± 0.015 0.925 ± 0.014 0.903 ± 0.020 0.905 ± 0.020
Ensemble-20 0.871 ± 0.019 0.938 ± 0.012 0.930 ± 0.006 0.913 ± 0.020
Ensemble-50 0.887 ± 0.019 0.944 ± 0.009 0.940 ± 0.009 0.934 ± 0.011
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.001 0.001 ± 0.001 0.001 ± 0.002
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.731 ± 0.366 0.729 ± 0.365 0.804 ± 0.269 0.710 ± 0.355
Random-Weight 0.642 ± 0.028 0.557 ± 0.051 0.482 ± 0.041 0.305 ± 0.034
Random-Weight-10 0.618 ± 0.055 0.594 ± 0.047 0.566 ± 0.040 0.497 ± 0.037
Random-Weight-20 0.603 ± 0.031 0.548 ± 0.040 0.532 ± 0.030 0.483 ± 0.036
Random-Weight-50 0.402 ± 0.043 0.419 ± 0.042 0.381 ± 0.074 0.373 ± 0.063
Mean Distortion 0.656 ± 0.017 0.776 ± 0.044 0.917 ± 0.063 1.122 ± 0.108
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 0.600 ± 0.026 0.722 ± 0.032 0.827 ± 0.075 1.133 ± 0.044
Table 9: CIFAR-10 Targeted L∞ Attack Results
Algorithm ϵ= 0.01 ϵ= 0.03 ϵ= 0.08
Baseline (no attack) 0.837 ± 0.009 0.842 ± 0.013 0.837 ± 0.015
Static 0.745 ± 0.020 0.435 ± 0.021 0.158 ± 0.015
Random-Model-10 0.825 ± 0.010 0.717 ± 0.137 0.581 ± 0.144
Ensemble-10 0.876 ± 0.010 0.848 ± 0.012 0.665 ± 0.018
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.787 ± 0.008 0.544 ± 0.017 0.225 ± 0.017
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.832 ± 0.010 0.761 ± 0.118 0.681 ± 0.153
Random-Weight 0.777 ± 0.018 0.775 ± 0.019 0.586 ± 0.025
Random-Weight-10 0.704 ± 0.017 0.673 ± 0.024 0.535 ± 0.021
Mean Distortion 0.544 ± 0.000 1.596 ± 0.001 4.063 ± 0.003
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 0.545 ± 0.000 1.601 ± 0.001 4.066 ± 0.004
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Table 10: MNIST Targeted L∞ Attack Results
Algorithm ϵ= 0.2 ϵ= 0.3 ϵ= 0.4
Baseline (no attack) 0.992 ± 0.003 0.993 ± 0.003 0.992 ± 0.002
Static 0.854 ± 0.022 0.558 ± 0.025 0.280 ± 0.021
Random-Model-10 0.954 ± 0.039 0.800 ± 0.140 0.603 ± 0.118
Ensemble-10 0.984 ± 0.006 0.936 ± 0.014 0.746 ± 0.052
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.909 ± 0.017 0.643 ± 0.030 0.294 ± 0.064
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.969 ± 0.020 0.871 ± 0.105 0.678 ± 0.175
Random-Weight 0.964 ± 0.012 0.873 ± 0.044 0.645 ± 0.071
Random-Weight-10 0.964 ± 0.013 0.794 ± 0.128 0.607 ± 0.085
Mean Distortion 5.504 ± 0.002 8.174 ± 0.004 10.784 ± 0.004
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 5.508 ± 0.002 8.181 ± 0.004 10.784 ± 0.005
Table 11: Traffic Sign Targeted L∞ Attack Results
Algorithm ϵ= 0.03 ϵ= 0.06 ϵ= 0.09
Baseline (no attack) 0.960 ± 0.005 0.961 ± 0.005 0.961 ± 0.008
Static 0.769 ± 0.020 0.465 ± 0.019 0.264 ± 0.016
Random-Model-10 0.854 ± 0.025 0.647 ± 0.100 0.512 ± 0.102
Ensemble-10 0.911 ± 0.014 0.749 ± 0.020 0.607 ± 0.023
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.820 ± 0.018 0.491 ± 0.025 0.263 ± 0.023
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.904 ± 0.023 0.792 ± 0.158 0.750 ± 0.171
Random-Weight 0.856 ± 0.032 0.698 ± 0.047 0.582 ± 0.035
Random-Weight-10 0.853 ± 0.019 0.684 ± 0.019 0.549 ± 0.033
Mean Distortion 1.624 ± 0.001 3.167 ± 0.003 4.642 ± 0.007
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 1.620 ± 0.001 3.158 ± 0.001 4.626 ± 0.003
Table 12: CIFAR-10 Untargeted L∞ Attack Results
Algorithm ϵ= 0.01 ϵ= 0.03 ϵ= 0.08
Baseline (no attack) 0.840 ± 0.010 0.841 ± 0.009 0.835 ± 0.014
Static 0.754 ± 0.021 0.378 ± 0.025 0.135 ± 0.009
Random-Model-10 0.825 ± 0.017 0.706 ± 0.170 0.568 ± 0.041
Ensemble-10 0.879 ± 0.009 0.844 ± 0.014 0.602 ± 0.023
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.791 ± 0.017 0.513 ± 0.021 0.176 ± 0.013
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.820 ± 0.018 0.758 ± 0.129 0.728 ± 0.020
Random-Weight 0.823 ± 0.011 0.769 ± 0.022 0.579 ± 0.032
Random-Weight-10 0.724 ± 0.035 0.695 ± 0.029 0.451 ± 0.027
Mean Distortion 0.545 ± 0.000 1.606 ± 0.001 4.111 ± 0.007
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 0.545 ± 0.000 1.608 ± 0.001 4.108 ± 0.004
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Table 13: MNIST Untargeted L∞ Attack Results
Algorithm ϵ= 0.2 ϵ= 0.3 ϵ= 0.4
Baseline (no attack) 0.992 ± 0.003 0.992 ± 0.003 0.992 ± 0.002
Static 0.801 ± 0.027 0.363 ± 0.025 0.133 ± 0.009
Random-Model-10 0.962 ± 0.009 0.841 ± 0.020 0.554 ± 0.146
Ensemble-10 0.981 ± 0.004 0.912 ± 0.009 0.635 ± 0.032
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.860 ± 0.016 0.479 ± 0.050 0.146 ± 0.023
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.971 ± 0.007 0.889 ± 0.043 0.573 ± 0.157
Random-Weight 0.960 ± 0.015 0.848 ± 0.042 0.568 ± 0.068
Random-Weight-10 0.956 ± 0.014 0.780 ± 0.122 0.526 ± 0.073
Mean Distortion 5.521 ± 0.001 8.220 ± 0.003 10.884 ± 0.004
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 5.523 ± 0.002 8.227 ± 0.002 10.892 ± 0.006
Table 14: Traffic Sign Untargeted L∞ Attack Results
Algorithm ϵ= 0.03 ϵ= 0.06 ϵ= 0.09
Baseline (no attack) 0.963 ± 0.006 0.960 ± 0.007 0.961 ± 0.007
Static 0.737 ± 0.028 0.440 ± 0.025 0.224 ± 0.030
Random-Model-10 0.850 ± 0.044 0.669 ± 0.073 0.546 ± 0.032
Ensemble-10 0.913 ± 0.012 0.739 ± 0.023 0.580 ± 0.026
Ensemble-AdTrain 0.808 ± 0.008 0.450 ± 0.021 0.242 ± 0.027
Ensemble-AdTrain-Random 0.904 ± 0.047 0.832 ± 0.132 0.784 ± 0.023
Random-Weight 0.864 ± 0.010 0.689 ± 0.024 0.538 ± 0.036
Random-Weight-10 0.848 ± 0.027 0.691 ± 0.042 0.534 ± 0.015
Mean Distortion 1.625 ± 0.001 3.197 ± 0.004 4.720 ± 0.004
Ensemble-AdTrain Distortion 1.626 ± 0.000 3.191 ± 0.001 4.699 ± 0.002
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